New Zealand advances India FTA, setting stage for duty-free Indian exports

The India–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement has moved decisively from negotiation to implementation, with New Zealand completing the legislation required to give effect to the pact signed in New Delhi on April 27, 2026.

The implementing legislation received Royal Assent on September 17, clearing a major domestic hurdle on the New Zealand side.

For India, the significance goes well beyond another trade agreement. Once both countries complete their remaining domestic procedures and the FTA enters into force, 100% of Indian exports will receive duty-free access to the New Zealand market.

This could provide an immediate competitive advantage to sectors such as textiles and apparel, leather and footwear, engineering goods, pharmaceuticals, gems and jewellery, agriculture and processed foods.

The opportunity is particularly important for India's labour-intensive industries and MSMEs. New Zealand previously maintained tariffs of up to 10% on some Indian products, including ceramics, carpets, automobiles and auto components. Their removal can improve the price competitiveness of Indian manufacturers and help exporters compete on more equal terms with suppliers from countries that already enjoy preferential access.

But tariff elimination by itself will not generate exports. The next challenge is implementation. Indian agencies must ensure that exporters understand rules of origin, certification requirements, customs procedures and product standards. Customs systems and export-promotion institutions will have to be ready from the first day of implementation. For MSMEs in particular, complicated documentation can effectively become a non-tariff barrier even when the headline tariff is zero.

The agreement also goes substantially beyond merchandise trade. It covers services and professional mobility, including expanded pathways for Indian students and skilled professionals. New Zealand has offered access across 118 service sectors, while the agreement provides a dedicated temporary-employment pathway for 5,000 Indian professionals and enhanced post-study work opportunities for students.

Another potentially consequential provision is the commitment to facilitate $20 billion of investment into India. The investment framework is intended to support areas including manufacturing, infrastructure, startups, renewable energy, digital services and emerging technologies. If converted into actual projects, this could make the FTA an investment and technology partnership rather than merely a tariff-reduction agreement.

The broader lesson is that signing an FTA is only the beginning. India must now focus on utilisation. Export promotion councils, DGFT, customs authorities, state governments and industry associations should identify products where zero-duty access can translate quickly into market share.

New Zealand is not among the world's largest markets, but the agreement can become a useful test of India's emerging FTA strategy: negotiate market access, protect sensitive domestic sectors, expand mobility and investment, and then ensure that Indian businesses actually use the opportunities created.

The diplomatic work has largely delivered the framework. The commercial challenge now is to turn preferential access into exports, investment and jobs.

Chile marks 216th National Day, celebrates 77 years of diplomatic relations with India

Attended the reception marking Chile’s 216th National Day, an evening that brought together diplomats, dignitaries and prominent guests while also celebrating 77 years of India–Chile diplomatic relations.

Ministry of External Affairs Secretary (East) Shri. Rudrendra Tandon, the chief guest, described the partnership as “warm and long-standing,” highlighting the expanding areas of cooperation between the two countries.

Ambassador of Chile to India His Excellency Juan Angulo offered a historical perspective, recalling that connections between Chile and the Indian subcontinent stretch back more than two centuries.

“Our relationship with the Indian subcontinent started indeed just after our independence, with records of ships coming from Valparaíso to Kolkata as early as the 1820s,” he said.

From maritime contacts in the 19th century to an increasingly broad diplomatic and economic partnership today, the evening was a reminder of the historical roots and continuing evolution of India–Chile relations.

BRICS as a geopolitical startup

Think of BRICS as a geopolitical startup: Ambitious, imperfect and still searching for a model that works.

For all the summits, declarations and photographs of leaders together, BRICS today remains largely a forum for consultation and coordination. It does not possess the institutional machinery, economic integration or strategic cohesion required to fundamentally reshape the global order.

But startups are about potential. And BRICS has the potential to become a geopolitical unicorn.

The real opportunity may not lie in creating a BRICS currency. That idea faces formidable economic and political obstacles. Trade among BRICS members is deeply unbalanced, and any common currency architecture would inevitably raise the question of China's economic dominance—something India and several other members would have strong reasons to resist.

The more consequential development could be much less dramatic: interoperability of payment systems. Can BRICS connect national payment and settlement systems without creating a common currency—and without exposing India to new financial, technological and security risks? If it can, the implications could be significant.

Such an architecture would require coordination among central banks, payment operators, foreign-exchange markets, cybersecurity agencies and regulatory authorities. Countries could continue using their own currencies while developing mechanisms for faster and cheaper cross-border settlement. It would not dethrone the dollar overnight, but it could gradually reduce dependence on dollar-based infrastructure for some categories of trade.

There is also a geopolitical incentive. Across BRICS and parts of the Global South, dissatisfaction is growing with Washington's use of tariffs, financial restrictions, sanctions and other instruments of economic power. That is encouraging countries with otherwise very different strategic interests to explore alternatives to systems dominated by the United States.

BRICS does not need to become an anti-American alliance to matter. Nor does it need a common currency. If it can build practical financial infrastructure that allows countries to trade and settle payments more efficiently while retaining monetary sovereignty, it could evolve from a diplomatic talking shop into something considerably more consequential.

The biggest BRICS story may therefore not be de-dollarisation. It may be interoperability. And that is where this geopolitical startup could begin its journey towards becoming a unicorn.

BRICS 2026: Beyond de-dollarisation, the case for cooperation in a multipolar world

BRICS 2026 takeaways from New Delhi: De-dollarisation talk remains just that — talk.

For now, the US dollar has no credible substitute at the heart of global trade and finance. BRICS nations will continue using it extensively, even as they make slow, incremental moves towards settling more bilateral trade in national currencies where feasible.

The obstacle is economic as much as political. Trade within BRICS is deeply unbalanced. India alone runs a trade deficit of more than $200 billion with BRICS economies. Local-currency settlement can change how trade is paid for; it cannot make these structural imbalances disappear.

But the Summit is demonstrating something potentially more consequential: countries with significant geopolitical differences can still trade, negotiate and cooperate.

The unanimously adopted New Delhi Declaration is a case in point. Despite sharp differences over West Asia, BRICS expressed “deep concern” over escalating tensions and called for maximum restraint, dialogue and diplomacy. The consensus reportedly required bridging differences between Iran and the UAE. 

The declaration also condemned attacks on civilian infrastructure and safeguarded peaceful nuclear facilities, as well as sanctions imposed without UN Security Council authorisation. It named no responsible countries—a compromise that preserved consensus, though at the cost of sharper attribution.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s formulation was equally significant: “BRICS is not against anyone.” His argument that the Global South should become a “rule-shaper”, rather than merely a participant in global governance, positions BRICS as a platform for reform rather than confrontation.

Perhaps that is the larger New Delhi message: BRICS does not have to become an anti-Western bloc to become an influential force in a multipolar world.

The BRICS moment: Modi walks with Putin, Pezeshkian, Ramaphosa

The image captures more than diplomatic camaraderie; it offers a striking visual metaphor for the expanding political geometry of BRICS. 

Prime Minister Narendra Modi walking alongside Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Russian President Vladimir Putin and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa brings together four countries with very different political systems, strategic interests and relationships with the West. Yet their presence together under the BRICS banner illustrates the grouping’s central proposition: emerging powers need not agree on every geopolitical question to cooperate in reshaping global institutions, trade and finance.

For India, the symbolism is particularly significant. New Delhi maintains deep strategic ties with Russia, important connectivity and energy interests with Iran, and a longstanding partnership with South Africa, while simultaneously expanding relations with the USA and Europe. Modi’s position in this grouping therefore reflects India’s broader foreign-policy strategy—strategic autonomy rather than alignment with a single bloc. 

The real test for BRICS, however, is whether such political symbolism can be translated into workable arrangements on trade, payments, development finance and reform of global governance despite substantial differences among its members.

From 1873 to 2026: The Enduring India–Suriname Connection

Met Her Excellency Ms. Hanisha Jairam, Ambassador of Suriname to India, today for an insightful conversation on the deep historical, cultural and people-to-people ties between India and Suriname.

Our discussion traced this remarkable relationship from the arrival of Indians in Suriname in 1873 and the preservation of Indian identity, traditions and culture across generations, to their place in Suriname’s vibrant multicultural society.

We also discussed reconnecting younger generations with this shared heritage, expanding tourism and educational exchanges, and translating this deep cultural capital into stronger economic, commercial and strategic cooperation between India and Suriname.

Diplomatic transitions at Japan Embassy as India–Japan ties gain momentum

Attended a reception hosted at the Embassy of Japan to bid farewell to senior Japanese diplomats moving on to new assignments across the world, and to welcome the officers beginning their diplomatic innings in India.

His Excellency Ono Keiichi, Ambassador of Japan to India, along with the new Minister & Deputy Chief of Mission, the new Minister (Political Affairs) and the outgoing Minister (Political Affairs) addressed the gathering, reflecting on their assignments and the importance of strengthening India–Japan relations.

The reception brought together diplomats, government officials, industry leaders, investors and members of the media—making for an engaging evening of conversations on diplomacy, business and the expanding strategic relationship between India and Japan.

Wishing the departing diplomats success in their new assignments, and a warm welcome to those beginning their journey in India.